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Abstract 
In a time of global crisis, international policy coordination is quite natural. 
Yet, in normal times such coordination becomes a challenge. This is an 
issue especially when it comes to monetary and macroprudential policy of 
globally influential countries. This is especially relevant now with the trend 
of monetary normalisation in many of these countries. 
 
In this brief, we propose four necessary steps to help addressing these 
challenges: 
- Monetary policy should take into account its spillovers on financial 
stability 
- Systemic central banks need to account for the global impact of their 
policy 
- Multilateral consultations may provide a useful platform to assess 
these impacts 
- The analysis that helps designing monetary and macroprudential 
policy should include global aggregates to capture the global 
economic and financial context. 
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Challenge 
Global financial stability remains a major concern for policymakers, especially 
now that some of the systemically important central banks are normalizing 
their monetary policy.1 More specifically, the challenges are:  
• Monetary policy and its transmission mechanism towards inflation and to the 
real cycle have become less predictable, due to the “extraordinarily 
accommodative and prolonged monetary easing”. Hence, exiting this phase is a 
major challenge.2 
• Yet, monetary policy has an impact on investors’ risk appetite and on financial 
stability, especially when it comes to systemic central banks such as the Fed. 
• Global financial stability would benefit from more coordination of monetary 
policies. Unfortunately, such a solution is rather unlikely. 3  Moreover, 
internalizing spillovers and spillbacks of monetary policies is far from 
technically straightforward.   
• There is evidence of a global financial cycle whereby monetary decisions in 
major financial centers – and, in particular, in the USA – drive capital flows all 
over the world influencing the supply of credit and its international distribution 
4. 
• As the global financial cycle is not aligned with individual countries’ specific 
macroeconomic conditions, international capital flows can cause financial 
booms and instability, quite independently of exchange rate regimes.5 
• In a time of global crisis, international policy coordination is quite natural. Yet, 
                                                     
1 See Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform (2011) 
2 See Borio (2012).  
3 See Plosser (2018). 
4See Rey (2018). The tendency of financial cycles to become “global” insn’t easy to explain. 
But “there is a growing evidence that the cross-border component of credit tends to outgrow 
the purely domestic one during financial booms…. The reasons for this regularity are not yet 
fully clear. One may simply be the natural tendency for [international] wholesale funding to 
gain ground as credit booms”: Borio (2012), p.6.  
5  See Borio and Disyatat (2011) and Committee on International Economic Policy and 
Reform (2012).  
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in normal time such coordination becomes a challenge. This is an issue 
especially when it comes to monetary and macroprudential policy of globally 
influential countries. 
In this brief, we propose four necessary steps that, we believe, would help 
address these challenges: 
- Monetary policy should take into account its spillovers on financial 
stability 
- Systemic central banks need to account for the global impact of their 
policy 
- Multilateral consultations may provide a useful platform to assess these 
impacts 
- The analysis that helps design monetary and macroprudential policy 
should include global aggregate to capture the global economic and 
financial context. 
Proposal  
At the country level, the interconnection between monetary policy and financial 
stability cannot be ignored 
In a time of crisis, domestic policy coordination is quite natural as all the 
different authorities in charge of fiscal, monetary and financial stability policies 
cooperate to minimize the scope of the crisis and to restore the financial 
stability. 
However, in normal times, things are more challenging as the goals of the 
different economic policies do not automatically converge anymore: monetary 
policy target prices and economic stability while the financial-stability policy 
focuses on enhancing the resilience of the financial system so it can fulfill its 
three main functions (to provide the core financial services of intermediation, 
risk management, and payments) even when under significant stress.  
Coordination between both policies is not easy for several reasons: measuring 
financial stability is a controversial exercise; financial stability can sometimes 
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require monetary policies that do not favor price stability; it depends heavily 
on factors that are far from being controlled by monetary authorities; financial 
stability issues are often heavily politicized and could endanger the 
independence of monetary policy. 6  Yet, many central banks during the last 
decade worked at strengthening the resilience of the financial system. 
We agree that “central banks should care about financial stability to the extent 
that it affects the health of the real economy”. 7 In other words, while financial 
stability should not be added to the monetary policy mandate, the design of the 
policy should take into account the spillovers and other linkages between the 
monetary policy actions and financial stability. 8 However, this requires close 
monitoring of the financial system and access to relevant information, beyond 
the banking system. 
We encourage the G20 to pursue its effort to identify and collect relevant data to 
better monitor the global financial system. Transparency in the data collecting 
process as well as their careful analysis is essential for that effort to be effective 
and for the central banks to assess properly potential vulnerabilities within the 
financial system that could be relevant when designing monetary policy strategy.     
Some degree of international coordination is necessary  
In a time of global crisis, international policy coordination is quite natural. Yet, 
in normal times such coordination becomes a challenge. When it comes to 
monetary and financial stability policies the lack of global coordination may 
generate unwelcome policy spillovers.9 More specifically: 
- Monetary policies of systematically important central banks have an 
impact on the global financial cycle – drive capital flows all over the world 
affecting the supply of credit and its international distribution. This is 
especially true for policy made in the US. 
- As a result, many countries have to implement macroprudential answers 
                                                     
6 Lopez et al (2015) 
7 Mester (2016) 
8 Svensson (2018) 
9 Lopez et al. (2018) 
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to counter the destabilizing effects of the US policy on their economies. 
While ideally, one would like to have international coordination of monetary 
and macroprudential policies, such a goal seems quite difficult to achieve, 
especially due to the heterogeneity of the different economies across the world. 
However, as suggested by Former Federal Reserve chair Janet Yellen, 
systemically important central banks, such as the Fed, must account for the 
spillover effects of their monetary policy on the global economy when 
designing it.10  
We believe that systemically central banks would benefit from having the 
opportunity to discuss the impact of their policy on the global economy with 
their peers. In other words, this would help them “recognizing and internalizing 
the unwelcome spillovers that policies can have, especially if financial cycles 
are not synchronized across countries”.11,12 
We suggest that the G20 entrusts the Global Monetary Policy Coordination 
Meetings (GMPC meetings), proposed in a T20 2018 policy brief, with the task of 
discussing and assessing the global impact of the different monetary and 
macroprudential policies, with a special focus on actions taken by systemically 
important countries 13  The G20 should then rely on an IMF-FSB taskforce to 
communicate the GMPC meeting conclusion.   
Relaunch multilateral consultations will facilitate cooperation.  
Prior to the global financial crisis, the IMF was worried about balance of 
payments imbalances, emphasizing the need for more global cooperation as 
early as 2006. The result was an innovative effort of policy coordination among 
the main protagonists of the world economy. “Multilateral consultations” on 
                                                     
10 Yellen (2019) 
11 Borio(2012) 
12  Our proposal is coherent with what suggested several years ago in Committee on 
International Economic Policy and Reform (2011): “Systemically significant central banks 
[should] meet regularly under the auspices of the Committee on the Global Financial System 
of the BIS. This group would discuss and assess the implications of their policies for global 
liquidity, leverage, and exposures, and the appropriateness of their joint money and credit 
policies from the point of view of global price, output, and financial stability”. 
13 Bruni, Siaba Serrate and Villafranca (2018, 2019) 
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global imbalances were launched convening a selected group of five countries 
to discuss their policy plans and commit to take appropriate measures to 
address vulnerabilities that affect individual members and the global financial 
system 14,15. Unfortunately, the multilateral consultations have been abandoned 
due to more urgent matters related to the global financial crisis16.  
The current situation of the world is such that global divisions and tensions 
seem stronger than cooperative efforts and symptoms of macro-financial 
fragility tend again to be overlooked. We therefore propose the use of these 
multilateral consultations, based on the IMF model. The consultations should 
concentrate on the current topical needs. We think the level of global debt is one 
of them. The multilateral consultations would complement the agenda of the 
GMPC meetings as they can involve smaller groups of countries and may allow 
more targeted programs on issues such as debt adjustment.  
Furthermore, one important task of global coordination is to avoid that the less 
advanced and less financially powerful countries become victims of the financial 
disorder of the big ones. Multilateral consultations (and GMPC meetings) are 
the right forums to make sure these nuances are not ignored. Even more 
                                                     
14 See Bracke et al (2008): “When the IMF designed its multilateral consultation process as 
a new global surveillance tool in 2006, global imbalances were selected as the first topic to 
be addressed, resulting in a detailed policy agenda for the major economies”. 
15  IMF (2007): “Multilateral consultations provide a new forum for discussion among 
members of the international community who share an interest in crucial economic issues. 
The consultations enable the IMF and its members to agree upon policy actions to address 
vulnerabilities that affect individual members and the global financial system. They will help 
policymakers to show that the measures they propose will be matched by measures taken 
by others, with benefits to all. The first multilateral consultation was launched in 2006 in 
order to address the issue of global payments imbalances with the IMF being entrusted to 
facilitate discussion and cooperation among senior policymakers”. “Under a multilateral 
consultation, specific issues of global or regional significance are taken up collectively with 
some IMF members and, where relevant, with entities formed by groups of members. Each 
multilateral consultation will focus on a specific international economic or financial issue 
and directly involve the countries that are party to that issue… A measure of success is that 
a second multilateral consultation, aimed at fostering dialogue on how financial globalization 
and innovation influence growth and stability, is under consideration“. Unfortunately this 
second consultation never took place. 
16 The “global imbalances issue” was important, even if a sideshow: see Suominen (2010) 
and for Europe see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
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important, that they are taken into account in the design of some policies. 
The inclusion of global aggregates when assessing a country’s economic 
performance and financial resilience is necessary.  
After the crisis, the G20 was fairly effective in pushing for changes in 
regulations that made the financial system of many countries more robust and 
resilient to shocks. In particular, banking systems (especially US banks) have 
been better capitalized while complex and opaque financial assets have been 
somewhat better regulated. However, new dangers seem to come, for instance, 
from booming “leveraged loans”.  
The continuous increase of public and private debts measured in terms of GDP 
at the world and regional levels signals a potential danger of financial 
instability. All evidences show that the ratio has gone up after 2008 – which 
was largely caused by excessive debt accumulation – even more than before 
(see the Figure below).17  
While macroprudential policies could help in keeping credit-to-GDP ratio in 
better control, the contribution of monetary policies to the increase in global 
indebtedness cannot be ignored. Even more, it seems essential that regulators 
keep track of the global economic and financial evolution as it influences the 
economy of their country. Hence, it should also affect their assessment of it.  
The use of global indicators such as global debt-to-GDP could facilitate that. 
This is especially true when the country significantly contributes to the global 
indicator considered. Defining some acceptable benchmarks or targets may 
also help the assessment and the design of relevant policies. 
We propose that the G20 advocates for the use of specific global indicators when 
countries assess their need of monetary and macroprudential policy. This would 
allow them to take into account the global economic and financial context and to 
anticipate some of the spillovers from the global system to their economy as well 
as their contribution to any global vulnerabilities. 
                                                     
17 See McKinsey Global Institute (2018), IMF (2019), BIS (2018). 
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